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ABSTRACT
DDoS-for-hire services, also known as booters, have com-
moditized DDoS attacks and enabled abusive subscribers of
these services to cheaply extort, harass and intimidate busi-
nesses and people by knocking them offline. However, due
to the underground nature of these booters, little is known
about their underlying technical and business structure. In
this paper we empirically measure many facets of their tech-
nical and payment infrastructure. We also perform an anal-
ysis of leaked and scraped data from three major booters—
Asylum Stresser, Lizard Stresser and VDO—which provides
us with an in-depth view of their customers and victims. Fi-
nally, we conduct a large-scale payment intervention in col-
laboration with PayPal and evaluate its effectiveness. Based
on our analysis we show that these services are responsible
for hundreds of thousands of DDoS attacks and identify po-
tentially promising methods of increasing booters’ costs and
undermining these services.
1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks are be-
coming a growing threat with high profile DDoS at-
tacks disrupting many large scale gaming services, such
as Microsoft’s XBox Live and Sony’s PlayStation net-
works at the end of 2014 [4]. These attacks were later
claimed to be launched by the Lizard Squad as ad-
vertisements for their new DDoS-for-hire service called
Lizard Stresser [3]. There is a long line of technical
work exploring how to detect and mitigate these types
of attacks [9, 10,14,20,21,23,24,33].
However, a large amount of DDoS attacks are being
launched by relatively unsophisticated attackers that
have purchased subscriptions to low-cost DDoS-for-hire
(commonly called booter) services. These services are
operated by profit-motivated adversaries that have scaled
up their DDoS infrastructure to meet the increasing de-
mand for DDoS attacks. Despite the threat they pose,
little is known about the structures of these booter ser-
vices and potential weaknesses in their operations that
could be used to undermine them.
In this paper we undertake a large scale measure-
ment study of these booter services to understand how
they are structured both technologically and econom-
ically with the focus of isolating potential weaknesses.
We explore booters from three different angles including
analysis of leaked and scraped data, measurements of
their attack infrastructure and a payment intervention.
Our analysis of leaked and scraped data from three
booters—Asylum Stresser, Lizard Stresser and VDO 1—
demonstrates that these services have attracted over
6,000 subscribers and have launched over 600,000 at-
tacks. We also find that the majority of booter cus-
tomers prefer paying via PayPal and that Lizard Stresser,
which only accepted Bitcoin, had a minuscule 2% sign-
up to paid subscriber conversion rate compared to 15%
for Asylum Stresser and 23% for VDO, which both ac-
cepted PayPal. By analyzing attack traffic directed at
our own servers we are able to characterize the set of
amplifiers they use to direct large amounts of traffic at
their victims. In order to measure the resilience of their
payment infrastructure, we conduct a payment inter-
vention in collaboration with PayPal. Our evaluation
of the effectiveness of this approach suggests that it is
a promising method for reducing the subscriber base of
booters.
In this paper, we further our understanding of the
booter ecosystem through our measurements. Based on
this we identify potential improvements to ongoing ef-
forts to disrupt their attack infrastructure and an alter-
native and possibly more effective method of undermin-
ing these services by targeting their payment infrastruc-
ture. Overall, we find a few places where costs might
be marginally increased by more precisely mapping out
and targeting parts of their attack infrastructure. We
document how a large-scale payment intervention by
PayPal impacts booters, including service closures. Fi-
nally, we detail some of their strategies for evading de-
tection by PayPal and discuss how these increase the
effort and costs associated with performing an ongoing
payment intervention.
1We assign each booter service a unique three letter code
based on their domain name to avoid unintentionally ad-
vertising their services. The two exceptions are Asylum
Stresser, which ceased operation before our study and Lizard
Stresser, which has already been highly publicized.
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2. BACKGROUND
In this section we explain the high level business and
technical structure of booter services as well as the un-
derlining ethical framework for our measurements.
2.1 Booter Services
Thinly veiled booter services have existed since at
least 2005 and primarily operate using a subscription-
based business model. As part of this subscription model,
customers or subscribers 2 can launch an unlimited num-
ber of attacks that have a duration typically ranging
from 30 seconds to 1-3 hours and are limited to 1-4
concurrent attacks depending on the tier of subscription
purchased. The price for a subscription normally ranges
from $10-$300 USD per month depending on the dura-
tion and number of concurrent attacks provided. These
services claim that they are only to be used by network
operators to stress test their infrastructure. However,
they have become synonymous with DDoS-for-hire and
are a growing threat due to the fact that they have
commoditized DDoS attacks that reach upwards of 2-
3 Gbps. By offering a low-cost shared DDoS attack
infrastructure, these criminal support services have at-
tracted thousands of malicious customers and are re-
sponsible for hundreds of thousands of DDoS attacks a
year as we will show in Section 4.
These services can be found by visiting underground
forums where they advertise and by web searches for
terms, such as “stresser” and “booter.” The services
are all in English; we did not find any evidence of sim-
ilar services that are focused on other markets, such as
Asian or Russian. They maintain frontend sites that al-
low their customers to purchase subscriptions and launch
attacks using simple web forms. Their backend infras-
tructure commonly consists of databases that maintain
subscriber information, lists of misconfigured hosts that
can be used for DDoS amplification and most rent high-
bandwidth Virtual Private Servers (VPS) for attacks
rather than using botnets. Ironically, booter services
depend on DDoS-protection services, such as Cloud-
Flare, to protect their frontend and attack infrastruc-
ture from attacks launched by rival competing booter
services.
Figure 4 provides a detailed illustration of the infras-
tructure and process of using a booter service. ( 1 )
The customer first locates a booter site and visits their
frontend webserver, which is normally protected by Cloud-
Flare. ( 2 ) The customer must next purchase a sub-
scription using a payment method, such as Bitcoin or
PayPal. ( 3 ) The customer then uses the frontend
interface to request a DDoS attack against a victim.
( 4 ) This request is forwarded from the frontend server
to one of the backend attack servers. ( 5 ) The back-
2We use these two terms interchangeably in this paper.
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Figure 1: Structure of booter services.
end server then sends spoofed request packets to a set
of previously identified vulnerable amplification servers.
( 6 ) Finally, DDoS traffic in the form of replies is sent
to the victim from the abused amplification servers.
2.2 Ethical Framework
As part of the ethical framework for our study, we
placed a number of restrictions on the types of booter
services we actively interacted with and what we in-
cluded in this paper. First, we did not engage with
any DDoS service that advertised using botnets. For
example, in the case of Lizard Stresser, when we be-
came aware that a botnet was being used, we imme-
diately abandoned plans to collect active attack mea-
surements from this service and restricted ourselves to
passive measurements. Our victim server was connected
by a dedicated 1 Gbs network connection that was not
shared with any other servers. We also obtained con-
sent from our network operators before conducting any
DDoS attack experiments. When services used reflec-
tors, we minimized the attack durations.
When purchasing a subscription for a Booter service,
we selected the cheapest option to minimize the amount
of money given to these services. In total, we spent
less than $140 and no individual booter service received
more than $19 in payments as part of the measurements
in this paper. Payments were made primarily using
PayPal and we assumed that proper controls were put
in place at PayPal to mitigate the risk of money flowing
to criminal groups. Also, the 9 booters that overlapped
with our payment intervention study likely lost larger
sums of money due to our reporting of their PayPal
accounts than we paid to them.
We received an exemption from our Institutional Re-
view Board (IRB), since our study did not include any
personally identifiable information and was based on
publicly leaked data and measurements of services that
are publicly accessible. Finally, we did not disclose the
identity of customers or operators of these services even
when we became aware of their identities and we did not
reveal the identities of any victims unless they had been
previously publicly disclosed.
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Booter Period All Users Subscribers Revenue Attacks Targets
Asylum Stresser 10/2011-3/2013 26,075 3,963 $35,381.54 483,373 142,473
Lizard Stresser 12/2014-01/2015 12,935 176 $3,368 † 15,998 3,907
VDO‡ 12/2014-2/2015 11,975 2,779 $52,773* 138,010 38,539
Total - 50,985 6,918 $91,522.54 637,381 184,919
Table 1: Summary of Asylum Stresser and Lizard Stesser leaked databases and scraped VDO reported data. † Revenue was converted
from bitcoin to USD. *Revenue is estimated based on subscription cost and number of paying subscribers. ‡ Domain name is abbreviated
to the first three characters.
3. RELATED WORK
DDoS attack and defense techniques have been stud-
ied for close to two decades [9, 10, 14, 20, 21, 23, 24, 33].
There have also been several empirical studies of DDoS
attacks in the wild using backscatter analysis [18] which
were revisited by Wustrow et al. [32]. More recent stud-
ies have measured Network Time Protocol (NTP) based
DDoS attacks [7] and conducted broader measurements
of UDP amplifiers along with introducing methods to
identify spoofing-enabled networks [13].
Other studies have explored the structure of botnet
based DDoS attacks [5] and malware [6, 28]. However,
the closest related work to ours in this vein is by Ku¨hrer
et al. which monitored the impact of DDoS attacks on
victims [31] and an analysis of a leaked database from a
single booter service done by Karami and McCoy [12].
Our work differs from this previous work in that we are
focused on holistically understanding the stakeholders
and infrastructure these booter services rely on to op-
erate across a larger set of booter services.
Our study is in the same vein as prior work that views
security problems through an economic lens [19]. We set
out to understand the stakeholders and infrastructure of
criminal DDoS-for-hire enterprises as has been done in
other domains, such as abusive advertising [15, 17, 30]
and fake anti-virus [25]. Since booters are a criminal
support service rather than the previously studied do-
main of abusive advertising, they operate under a dif-
ferent set of constraints. In this respect our work is
more along the lines of studies focused on criminal sup-
port services, such as email spam delivery [11, 26], fake
social links [27] and fake account creation [29]. While
this same follow-the-money and payment intervention
approach has been explored in previous studies [16] our
study is the first, to our knowledge, that explores the ef-
fectiveness of this method against more robust criminal-
to-criminal payment methods rather then consumer-to-
criminal payments.
The largest contribution of our study is in charac-
terizing the ecosystem of subscription-based booter ser-
vices, which has not been studied in much depth. We
show that these booters are structured differently than
traditional botnet based DDoS services that are rented
for a fixed time period in terms of the underlying at-
tack infrastructure, customer base, business model and
payment methods. We believe that our findings enable
Operator Subscriber
CC % CC %
US 44.06% US 47.58%
PK 15.03% DE 10.45%
CA 13.99% GB 5.60%
GB 6.29% NL 4.87%
AU 3.15% RU 4.81%
Table 2: Top country IP geolocations of logins for booter oper-
ator’s and subscriber’s PayPal accounts.
a better understanding of the effectiveness of ongoing
efforts to disrupt their attack infrastructure at the am-
plifier and hosting level, a preliminary evaluation of the
potential effectiveness of a payment intervention along
with a detailed analysis of the nature of these services
and how they are structured.
4. INSIDE VIEW OF BOOTERS
In this section, we analyze publicly leaked backend
booter databases, scraped data and aggregated PayPal
account data. From this analysis we present some num-
bers to better understand the dynamics and scale of
booter services. This includes, the amount of revenue
generated, the number of users and their probable ge-
olocation, the number of victims and the number of
attacks initiated by the subscribers of these services.
4.1 Data Sets
Our datasets for this section are comprised of ag-
gregated PayPal account geolocation data provided by
PayPal, two leaked backend databases for Asylum and
Lizard Stresser and scraped data from VDO. A sum-
mary of these data sets is included in Table 1 and Ta-
ble 2. Before presenting our analysis we will first de-
scribe each of these data sets in more detail.
VDO Scraped Data. At the time we started mon-
itoring VDO to measure the scale of its operation in
early December 2014, it was one the top booter ser-
vices on underground forums with a high rate of pos-
itive reviews. During an eight weeks period ending in
early February 2015, we crawled this booter every 10-
minutes to collect data on users of the service and de-
tails of attacks launched by them. We found VDO to
be unique in reporting a wealth of public information
on their users and attack details. This data includes all
users that logged into the services in the past 15 minutes
and distinguishes paying subscribers from unpaid users.
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In addition, it displays a list of all currently running at-
tacks that includes the type of the attack, the target
of the attack, duration and the time remaining for the
attack to be finished. Users can optionally choose to
remain anonymous and hide attacks, but the default is
for all information to be public. Less than 30% of login
records scraped were anonymous and 39% of all attacks
seen were hidden.
While we cannot fully vet this self-reported data, we
did verify that the data representing our actions were
reported accurately. We also validated that all NTP at-
tacks reported for a day were accurate by sending mon-
list requests in 10-minute intervals to a set of 12 NTP
amplifiers known to be abused by VDO and recorded
the received responses. A total of 44 distinct victims
were the target of NTP attacks as reported by VDO
during that 24 hour time period and we were able to
find matching records for all 44 targets in the mon-
list responses collected from the set of monitored NTP
servers. This gives us some increased level of confidence
that the details of reported attacks and users are accu-
rate.
Asylum Stresser Backend Database. Asylum Stresser
was an established booter that was in operation for over
two years before their backend database was publicly
leaked, which covered 18 months of operational data
that included user registrations, payments and attack
logs. It ceased operation shortly after the leak and has
not resumed operation. This leaked database has been
vetted by many members of the anti-DDoS community
that located their own test accounts in the user regis-
tration data and is believed to be authentic.
Lizard Stresser Backend Database. Lizard Stresser
was launched in late December of 2014 by individuals
calling themselves the Lizard Squad. This same group
was responsible for DDoS attacks on Sony PlayStation
and Microsoft Xbox networks on December 25, 2014.
Later, the group announced that the attacks were meant
to demonstrate the power of Lizard Stresser, a booter
service they started to offer to users on a subscription
basis. As the attack infrastructure used by this service
was backed by hacked home Internet routers, we did
not directly interact with this service. However, their
backend database covering their first two weeks of op-
eration that included user registrations, payments and
attack logs was publicly leaked. For this database, since
all payments were in bitcoin and the wallet addresses
are included, we have validated that this part of the
database is accurate. We have also checked for internal
consistency within these leaked databases. While we
cannot rule out that some of the data has been fabri-
cated, it would take a fair amount of resources to create
this high fidelity of a forgery.
Aggregated PayPal Data. In order to understand
where booter operators and subscribers are potentially
located, we use aggregated data provided to us by Pay-
Pal that was computed from all the accounts identified
by PayPal as belonging to booter operators and sub-
scribers. This data did not include any scale on the
number of booter and subscriber accounts included in
the dataset. It was computed by assigning the location
for each account to the country from which the majority
of their logins occurred and computing the percentage
of accounts assigned to each country. In the case that
an account did not have a majority of their logins occur-
ring in a single country it was removed from the dataset.
This accounted for 3% of subscriber accounts and none
of operator accounts. Also, IP addresses for proxies,
VPN services, hosting service and Tor were removed
using a database from IP2Location 3
4.2 Subscribers
We find that 15% of Asylum users and 23% of all
VDO users purchased a subscription, however less than
2% of all Lizard Stresser users purchased a subscrip-
tion. This might be attributed to the fact that Asylum
and VDO both accepted PayPal payments at least spo-
radically while Lizard Stresser only accepted Bitcoin as
a payment method. It is difficult to attribute why the
conversion rate of registered users to subscribers is much
less for Lizard Stresser, since other factors, such as the
media coverage, might have also driven many users to
sign up out of curiosity. However, anecdotally 42 of
the 225 support tickets mention that the user wants to
purchase a subscription using PayPal. As one potential
attacker wrote, “I want to pay via paypal real bad I’m
a huge fan of and want to buy this ASAP but I don’t
have bitcoins.”
Based on the aggregated geolocation information pro-
vided by PayPal in Table 2, over 44% of the customer
and merchant PayPal accounts associated with Booters
are potentially owned by someone in the United States.
There are many inherent limitations of this data which
we cannot correct or quantify due to the highly aggre-
gated nature of the data. These include the fact that
booter services create multiple accounts to replace ones
that are limited by PayPal. Thus it might be the case
that a few booter services control a large number of
the total accounts and are biasing the location and the
same might hold for customers as well. Assuming it
is accurate, this might support the notion that these
services are to some extent limited in their ability to
accept payments using virtual currencies, such as Web-
money, which block residents in the United States from
creating accounts.
4.3 Revenue
Ayslum earned an average of $2,079/month. How-
3IP2Proxy IP-Country Database—http://www.
ip2location.com/databases/ip2proxy
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Figure 2: Asylum Stresser monthly revenue.
ever, as Figure 2 shows their revenue started at a mod-
est $500/month and grew to over $3,000/month to-
wards the end of the leaked data period. Also, it is
interesting to note that their revenue from subscrip-
tion renewals was $16,025.12 and almost equal to the
$19,356.42 earned from new subscriptions. The Lizard
Stresser leak only covers 2 weeks in which time they
earned $3,368 and VDO earned an estimated $24,737/month
confirming that VDO was operating at a far larger scale.
Asylum collect 99.4% ($35,180.14) of their revenue through
PayPal payments and only 0.6% ($201.40) of their rev-
enue was collected using their secondary payment method
of MoneyBookers. Lizard Stresser collected all their
revenue through their only supported payment method
of Bitcoin and VDO accepted both PayPal and Bit-
coin. All of this underscores the fact that revenue from
paid subscriptions and renewals is the driving factor for
operating these services and expanding them to grow
customer bases. They are presumably profitable, but
these individual booters do not generate the profits re-
quired to pay the upfront capital, fees and potential
fines for dedicated credit card merchant processing ac-
counts, which amounted to around $25-$50K per an ac-
count, as was the case with illicit pharmaceutical and
fake anti-virus groups that had revenues on the order
of millions of USD dollars a month [17,25].
4.4 Attacks
From the leaked data we find that these three booters
were responsible for over half a million separate attacks
against over 100,000 distinct IP addresses. While the
average attack from VDO only lasted 27 minutes this
data demonstrates the large-scale abuse problems and
unwanted traffic generated by these services. Our anal-
ysis of victims finds that they are predominantly resi-
dential links and gaming-related servers, with a small
number of higher profile victims, such as government,
journalist and law enforcement sites. This matches pre-
vious analysis of victims from leaked databases [12]. For
VDO our scraped data included the type of DDoS at-
tack launched and our analysis of this data shows that
amplified attacks where the adversary attempts to ex-
haust the bandwidth capacity of the victim’s connection
accounted for 72% of all attacks launch from VDO. The
next most popular class of attacks were SYN flooding
attacks, which made up only 16% of all attacks.
5. ATTACK INFRASTRUCTURE
Our measurements of booters’ attack infrastructure
are based on engaging with these services to understand
what techniques and hosts are being actively used for
attacks. Using this information we provide a better un-
derstanding of cost structure and trade-offs of different
attack techniques. It also informs defenders as to which
ISPs and hosts to focus on for blacklisting, remediation
and notification efforts. Our analysis of frontend servers
finds a reliance on CloudFlare to protect this infras-
tructure from takedown and DDoS. In addition, we find
that booters gravitate to using more stable amplifier in-
frastructure when possible. This differs from previous
studies that scan the Internet for the vulnerable popu-
lations of misconfigured amplification servers many of
which might be highly transient and not be used for
DDoS attacks. We also identify two hosting providers
connected to the same ISP that are actively courting
booter operators and providing stable high bandwidth
attack servers that allow spoofing.
This set of measurements is based on data gathered
from a combination of sources including subscribing to
booters and launching attacks against our server, ac-
tive probing measurements and analysis of two hosting
providers that rent attack servers.
5.1 Dataset
Our first task was to identify booter services for this
part of our study. Absent a centralized location for
finding booters, we found services via search engines
and advertisements on hacker forums such as hackedfo-
rums.net. We selected 15 booter services that received
the most positive feedback on underground forums for
our attack infrastructure characterization. The number
of booters was kept relatively small in order to minimize
the amount of money we paid to these services, which
totaled less than $140 and no individual booter service
received more than $19. We make no claim about the
coverage these booters provide of the entire ecosystem.
Rather, we were looking to provide a sample of stable
services most of them ranked highly for search terms
associated with booter services and they also garnered
the most positive replies to their advertisements on un-
derground forums.
We purchased a one month subscription from each
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Booter Attack Types Cost
ANO DNS $6.60
BOO NTP,Chargen $2.50
CRA DNS,SSDP £10.99
GRI NTP,SSDP $5.00
HOR NTP,SSDP $6.99
INB DNS,NTP,SSDP $11.99
IPS NTP,SSDP,Chargen $5.00
K-S SSDP,Chargen $3.00
POW SSDP $14.99
QUA DNS,SSDP $10.00
RES DNS,NTP $10.00
SPE DNS,NTP,SSDP,Chargen $12.00
STR DNS,SSDP $3.00
VDO DNS,NTP,SSDP $18.99
XR8 DNS $10.00
Table 3: List of booter services we measured, which of the four
attack types included in our measurements each booter offered
and cost of cheapest one month subscription.
of the services which ranged from $2.50-18.99 and fo-
cused on measuring amplification attacks based on our
measurements of VDO that showed this was the most
common type of attack and the fact that amplification
attacks were the default attack type for all 15 booters.
More precisely, we chose to measure the most common
amplification reflection attack types offered by the boot-
ers, which were SSDP, NTP, DNS and Chargen. Table 3
shows the set of booters, which of the four attack types
that booter offered and the cost of a basic month sub-
scription.
We conducted attacks directed at our target server
from December 2014 - January 2015. The goal of these
attacks was to map out the set of misconfigured hosts
that were being used by each booter to amplify their
reflection attacks. The configuration of our target sys-
tem used for measuring the attacks was an Intel Xeon
3.3GHz server running Ubuntu with 32 GB of RAM and
an isolated 1 Gbps dedicated network connection.
We used gulp [22], which is a lossless Gigabit packet
capture tool to capture attack traffic. Each attack lasted
for one hour total and was comprised of many shorter
attack instances of 10 minutes each, which is the stan-
dard time limit for basic subscriptions. The reason-
ing behind the longer attack times was to increase our
probability of identifying all the misconfigured reflec-
tion hosts used by a booter for each attack type. How-
ever, we found almost all of the amplification servers
were identified after the first attack. Therefore we lim-
ited our attacks to shorter durations for the rest of our
experiments that required launching attacks.
5.2 Frontend Servers
Booter services maintain a frontend website that al-
lows customers to purchase subscriptions and launch
DDoS attacks using convenient drop-down menus to
specify the attack type and victim’s IP or domain name.
These frontend websites commonly come under DDoS
attack by rival booters and are subject to abuse com-
plaints from anti-DDoS working groups. All 15 booters
in our study use CloudFlare’s DDoS protection services
to cloak the ISP hosting their frontend servers and to
protect them from abuse complaints and DDoS attacks.
As part of this study we contacted CloudFlare’s abuse
email on June 21st 2014 to notify them of the abu-
sive nature of these services. As of the time of writing
this paper, we have not received any response to our
complaints and they continue to use CloudFlare. This
supports the notion that at least for our set of booters
CloudFlare is a robust solution to protect their fron-
tend servers. In addition, crimeflare.com has a list of
over 100 booters that are using CloudFlare’s services to
protect their frontend servers.
5.3 Attack Servers
Provider VPS IP Uplink speed Bandwidth Monthly cost
CaVPS Host 192.210.234.203 3.5 Gbps Unmetered $35
Spark Servers 96.8.114.146 949 Mbps 10 TB $60
Table 4: Spoofing enabled VPS services.
Renting back-end servers to generate attack traffic is
the primary source of cost for the operators of booter
services. We did some research to get a broad sense of
the market availability and cost of back-end servers that
allow the source IP address to be spoofed. Being spoof
friendly, fast uplink speed and high caps or unmetered
bandwidth usage are the key requirements of a server
appropriate for supporting the operation of a booter
service.
In order to understand if these services delivered on
their claims of allowing spoofing and providing the band-
width they advertised we rented Virtual Private Servers
(VPS) from two hosting providers that advertised on
underground forums. Table 4 summarizes the services
that we purchased. Both of the VPSs we purchased
were connected to the same ISP (ColoCrossing) in the
US. We also verified that both VPSs allowed spoofing
and measured their actual link speeds. One VPS pro-
vided around 1Gbps uplink bandwidth and the other
one interestingly provided up to 3.5Gbps. The servers
we purchased were virtual and therefore running on
shared hardware. A busy booter service would need to
use dedicated servers with more resources to support its
operation. The price range for a dedicated servers with
a link speed of 1Gbps and unlimited bandwidth usage
was around $300-$500. Due to budget limitations we
could only rent these two VPSs and did not rent any
higher end dedicated servers. However, our initial re-
sults show that this is a potentially effective method of
mapping out abusive hosting and we plan to scale this
part of our measurements as future work.
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Chargen DNS NTP SSDP
Booter (#) (%) (#) (%) (#) (%) (#) (%)
ANO - - 1,827 73% - - - -
BOO 370 65% - - 1,764 86% - -
CRA - - 43,864 56% - - 64,874 46%
GRI - - - - 1,701 72% 10,121 60%
HOR - - - - 8,551 58% 242,397 30%
INB - - 38,872 55% 4,538 92% 170,764 54%
IPS 1,636 44% - - 1,669 85% 90,100 29%
K-S 1,422 30% - - - - 5,982 76%
POW - - - - - - 1,424,099 11%
QUA - - 10,105 85% - - 39,804 67%
RES - - 2,260 82% 27 100% - -
SPE 2,358 38% 26,851 61% 6,309 35% 258,648 24%
STR - - 93,362 53% - - 7,126 74%
VDO - - 16,133 82% 6,325 82% 150,756 62%
XR8 - - 44,976 52% - - - -
Total 4,565 23.46% 181,298 35.30% 17,599 42.31% 2,145,015 11.84%
Table 5: Number of total amplification servers and percentage of overlap with amplifications servers used by other booters.
5.4 Attack Techniques
Due to their effectiveness, amplified volume-based at-
tacks are the default attack technique offered by most
booter services. We focused our analysis on SSDP (more
commonly known as Universal Plug and Play (UPnP)),
DNS, NTP and Chargen. These attacks depend on
servers running misconfigured UPnP, DNS resolvers,
NTP and Chargen services that enable attackers to am-
plify attack traffic by sending spoofed packets with the
victim’s source address in the IP header and having
these services respond with a larger amount of traffic
directed to the victim.
We have also seen booter services offering reflection-
based attacks by misusing popular web Content Man-
agement Systems (CMS) such as WordPress and Joomla
to generate and direct HTTP requests to target web
servers.
In addition, many booters offer direct attacks includ-
ing TCP SYN, and UPD flood where the attack spoofs
the source IP address and directly sends packets to
the victim. Some booters also implement HTTP-based
attacks including HTTP POST/GET/HEAD, RUDY
(R-U-Dead-Yet) and Slowloris using proxies to conceal
their attack server’s IP address.
5.5 Amplifiers
As part of our measurements we can map out the set
of amplifiers that are being abused to magnify the traffic
volume of attacks. This sheds light on the population
of hosts that are not only vulnerable to amplification
attacks, but are actively being abused. Table 5 shows
that the set of abused Chargen and NTP servers are
smaller and more highly shared between two or more
services, whereas there is an ample supply of DNS and
SSDP servers that are used as amplifiers. However, the
overlap of DNS servers used by two or more booter ser-
vices is still relatively high suggesting that these DNS
resolvers might be more stable, have higher bandwidth
CC % AS %
Chargen
CN 48.78% 4134 (Chinanet) 14.46%
US 12.51% 37963 (Hangzhou Alibaba Advertising) 10.47%
KR 5.50% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 6.88%
RU 4.58% 17964 (Beijing Dian-Xin-Tong Network) 2.61%
IN 2.56% 7922 (Comcast Cable Communications) 2.61%
DNS
US 12.38% 4134 (Chinanet) 2.68%
RU 11.58% 3462 (Data Communication Business Group) 2.15%
BR 9.19% 18881 (Global Village Telecom) 1.46%
CN 6.84% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 1.45%
JP 3.61% 7922 (Comcast Cable Communications) 1.27%
NTP
US 31.47% 3462 (Data Communication Business Group) 14.01%
TW 15.29% 46690 (Southern New England Telephone) 12.35%
CN 10.68% 7018 (AT&T Services) 4.84%
KR 5.50% 4134 (Chinanet) 3.58%
RU 4.74% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 2.18%
SSDP
CN 36.26% 4837 (CNCGROUP China169 Backbone) 18.98%
US 19.37% 4134 (Chinanet) 11.16%
EG 6.83% 8452 (TE Data) 6.61%
AR 5.37% 22927 (Telefonica de Argentina) 5.13%
CA 5.36% 7922 (Comcast Cable Communications) 4.60%
Table 6: Top country locations and autonomous systems for
amplifiers.
connections and be in more limited supply.
5.6 Amplifier Location
As demonstrated by Table 6 both the geolocation
and AS of amplifiers used by booters are fairly diffuse.
There are a few notable exceptions, such as the con-
centration of Chargen amplifiers in China with three
Chinese ASs connecting 34% of these amplifiers. In ad-
dition, there is a slight concentration of abused NTP
servers connected to one Taiwanese AS and two United
States network operators. This might indicate a poten-
tial to focus notification and patching efforts on these
networks, given the limited pool of hosts used for Char-
gen and NTP attacks from Table 5. Feeds of these ac-
tively abused servers could also be distributed to these
network operators and to DDoS mitigation services.
5.7 Amplifiers Churn
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Figure 3: IP churn of amplifiers.
In order to measure the stability of these amplifiers
we probed them periodically for 13 weeks to understand
how many were still located at the same IP and vulner-
able to abuse. As shown in Figure 3, the set of DNS
resolvers were the most stable with nearly 80% still vul-
nerable and located at the same IP after one month and
over 60% were still misconfigured after 13 weeks. This
result is counter to the previous results of churn based
on Internet wide scanning that found a 50-60% churn
rate for DNS servers after one week [13]. It indicates
that booters have gravitated to using a more stable set
of DNS resolvers and that focusing mitigation efforts
on these might cause these DNS attacks to be less effi-
cient and require additional bandwidth and cost. From
our measurements, SSDP servers where the least stable
with a 50% churn rate after only a single week. This re-
sult agrees with the previous Internet wide scanning re-
sult and indicates that either booters have not found or
there might not exist a set of more stable SSDP servers.
5.8 Amplification Factor
One of the few direct costs incurred for every attack a
booter service launches is the bandwidth sent from their
rented attack servers. In order to reduce this cost am-
plification attacks are used for volume-based flooding
attacks. Some attack methods can potentially produce
a larger amplification factor then others, but there are
many factors that effect the amplification factor. Our
measurements largely agree with the lower-end band-
width amplification factor numbers reported in a pre-
vious study [13], with NTP attacks resulting in an av-
erage amplification factor of 603 times, Chargen being
the next largest at 63 times, DNS resulting in an aver-
age of 30 times amplification and SSDP generating the
smallest average amplification factor of 26 times. This
and the limited number of NTP amplifiers confirms that
the communities focus on prioritizing notification and
patching of misconfigured NTP servers is the correct ap-
proach. We also suggest that some effort be placed into
efforts to notify operators of servers with misconfigured
and abused Chargen services, since these are the next
largest threat and there is also a potentially constrained
supply.
6. PAYMENT INTERVENTION
As part of our study we sought out opportunities to
understand and also measure the effectiveness of un-
dermining DDoS Services. In this section, we present
our measurements of a payment intervention that was
conducted in collaboration with PayPal.
We find that reporting accounts to responsive pay-
ment service providers, such as PayPal, can have the
desired effect of limiting their ability and increasing the
risk of accepting payments using these payment ser-
vices. Although, this technique requires constant mon-
itoring of the booters and drives them to move to more
robust payment methods, such as Bitcoin.
6.1 Payment Ecosystem
At the onset of our study the majority of booter ser-
vices accepted credit card payments via PayPal as their
primary mechanism for receiving funds from their cus-
tomers. In addition to PayPal, some booters accepted
bitcoin payments and a limited number of booters also
accepted credit card payments using Google Wallet4
and virtual currencies, such as WebMoney and Per-
fect Money—these last two prohibit customers from the
United States from opening an account and using their
platform.
We identified a larger set of 60 booter services 5 that
accepted PayPal and created custom crawlers to moni-
tor their payment methods and merchant accounts for
about 6 weeks from April 22, 2014 through June 07,
2014. These booters were located from underground
forum advertisements and web searches for terms com-
monly associated with booter services. Again we make
no claim about the coverage these booters provide of
the entire ecosystem. To minimize the effect of unstable
booters on our study, the final set of booters included
in our analysis was limited to the 23 stable booter ser-
vices that were able to successfully use PayPal to receive
funds for at least half of the time before the PayPal in-
tervention and used at least one PayPal account after
the intervention. Nine of these 23 booter services over-
lapped with the set of 15 booters measured in section 5,
among the reasons that six booters were not included
in this measurement is that some did not accept PayPal
and others did not accept PayPal over half the time in
the first 6 week period.
4Google phased out their digital goods payment processing
at the start of March 2015 — https://support.google.
com/wallet/business/answer/6107573.
5This set is larger than the previous set, since we did not
have to pay for a subscription in order to monitor their pay-
ment accounts.
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Booter accounts before accounts after Status
ANO ? 6 (8.2) 7 (2.9) 3
AUR 6 (7.2) 6 (2.7) 7
BOO • 6 (8.3) 11 (2.7) 3
CRI † 4 (9.0) 1 (2.0) 7
DAR  4 (6.0) 5 (4.8) 3
DIA † 3 (15.7) 0 (-) 7
GET 2 (14.0) 1 (4.0) 3
GRI ? 4 (10.5) 1 (6.0) 3
HAZ  4 (12.2) 5 (5.6) 3
IDD  3 (7.7) 2 (9.0) 3
IPS  3 (7.3) 5 (5.4) 3
POW 5 (4.5) 9 (5.0) 3
PRI 6 (8.8) 2 (1.0) 7
QUA 11 (4.3) 22 (1.8) 3
RAG • 13 (3.9) 4 (2.0) 3
REB 2 (11.5) 9 (2.3) 7
RES ? 6 (8.2) 7 (2.9) 3
SNO 1 (-) 0 (-) 7
STA 5 (13.0) 3 (5.3) 3
STR 1 (47.0) 1 (4.0) 3
TIT  12 (5.3) 17 (2.9) 3
XR8 4 (10.5) 11 (1.6) 3
XRS • 8 (5.2) 4 (2.5) 7
119 (7.84) 133 (3.07)
Table 7: Number of PayPal accounts used by monitored booters
before and after the intervention. The numbers within the () are
the average lifespan of the accounts used by that booter. Accounts
that are active both before and after are counted only in the before
and not included when computing the average lifespan. Matching
symbols indicate that this set of booters shared at least one PayPal
account. These shared accounts might be instances of a third
party agreeing to accept payments for these services.
After collecting our initial data on the stability of
their PayPal merchant accounts, we reported these booter’s
domains and accounts to PayPal and they began to
monitor merchant accounts linked to these domains and
suspending them after an investigation. Note that Pay-
Pal will initially limit reported merchant accounts that
are found to violate their terms of service by accepting
payments for abusive services and perform an investi-
gation of the account. Once an account is limited the
merchant cannot withdraw or spend any of the funds
in their account. This will result in the loss of funds in
these accounts at the time of freezing and potentially
additional losses due to opportunity cost while estab-
lishing a new account. In addition, PayPal performed
their own investigation to identify additional booter do-
mains and limited accounts linked to these domains as
well. This had the affect of a large-scale PayPal pay-
ment disruption for the majority of booter services.
In order to further understand the effectiveness of
our payment intervention, we monitored underground
forums where these booters advertise their services and
news feeds from booters we joined to discover quali-
tative data on the effectiveness of PayPal’s payment
intervention.
6.2 Usage Pattern of PayPal Accounts
Based on our observations, booter services for the
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Figure 4: PayPal account usage over time. Black asterisks
denote a new PayPal account and gaps in the blue line represent
PayPal unavailability for that time period. The red vertical line
indicates when the reporting of accounts started.
most part only use a single PayPal account at a time
to receive payments and change their PayPal merchant
account when a limit is put on their previous account or
they proactively change accounts to reduce the risk of
limits on their previous accounts. We used the dataset
collected during the initial monitoring period to un-
derstand how frequently booter services were changing
their PayPal accounts. Note that our age measures are
both right and left-censored. For the booter’s initial
account our data is left-censored and for the last ac-
count our data is right-censored. However, we believe
our age measurements accurately represent the effects of
the PayPal intervention based on our interactions with
and postings from the booters themselves.
Table 7 provides an overview of the PayPal accounts
observed by our crawler broken down by each service
monitored. As Table 7 shows accounts had an average
life time of slightly over a week before the intervention
with STR and SNO each using a single account that re-
mained active during the entire 47 day initial observa-
tion period and SNO’s account that remained active for
37 days after the intervention began. On the other end
of the spectrum, QUA, RAG and TIT changed accounts
every 4-5 days before the intervention. The impact of
the intervention can be visually seen in Figure 4.
Once the target intervention begins the average lifes-
pan of an account drops to around 3.5 days with many
booter’s PayPal accounts only averaging around two
days before they are no longer used again. Figure 4
visually shows the impact of the payment intervention
on the lifespan of booter services PayPal accounts and
provides some indication of the time period that elapsed
between a new PayPal account being actively used to
accept payments and when PayPal took action against
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the account or it was proactively replaced. The length
and number of PayPal outages increase after the in-
tervention, with only QUA and TIT avoiding major
PayPal outages by resorting to aggressively replacing
accounts. Note that this replacement strategy was not
fully effective, since our monitoring infrastructure de-
tected and reported these accounts.
6.3 Booters’ Status
As part of our daily monitoring of the 23 booter ser-
vices, we recorded if the service could accept PayPal
payments and if the site was functional. This enabled
us to better understand the impact of the payment in-
tervention on the booter’s ability to accept PayPal pay-
ments and the operation of the service. For each booter,
we placed it in one of the following statuses each day
based on the results of our crawl.
Active: The booter is able to successfully use a PayPal
account to receive payments from its customers.
Unreachable/Broken: Either the booter’s frontend
website was not responding to HTTP requests, the booter
service had closed or the frontend site was not func-
tional.
PayPal Disabled: The booter’s frontend website is
active, but the service has either removed PayPal as
a payment option, or the PayPal account linked to the
booter website is limited and therefore unable to receive
payments.
Figure 5 shows the status of booter services over time.
The vertical line represents the date on which we started
sharing our data with PayPal and PayPal started to in-
dependently investigate the reported accounts and take
action against them. As observed in Figure 5, the per-
centage of active booters quickly drops from 70-80% to
around 50% within a day or two following the interven-
tion date and continues to decrease to a low of around
10% and then fluctuating between 10-30%. This re-
sulted in an increase in PayPal unavailability from 20%
before the intervention to 63% during the intervention.
In addition, we observed 7 booter services in our study
shut down their business and most of the remaining
services switch to alternative payment methods, such
as Bitcoin.
6.4 Qualitative Assessments
In addition to our quantitative measurements, we also
have qualitative evidence of PayPal’s payment interven-
tions efficacy. By monitoring the underground forums
where these services advertise we can witness the impact
of these account limitations. Wrote one booter opera-
tor during the intervention, “So until now 5 time my
5 PayPal Accounts got Limited on My stresser is other
stresser have same Problem with the fucking Paypal ?
is there any solution what we should do about fucking
Paypal ?” Similarly, customers vented their frustration
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Figure 5: Status of booters over time.
at being unable to purchase a booter service using Pay-
Pal. Wrote one booter customer, “when i go to buy a
booter it normally says i can’t buy because their PayPal
has a problem.”
In a number of cases booters directly link their closers
to loss of funds due to PayPal merchant account limi-
tations. This message was posted on the front page of
a defunct booter service, “It’s a shame PayPal had to
shut us down several times causing us to take money
out of our own pocket to purchase servers, hosting, and
more.”
6.5 Booter Response
As with any intervention the adversary, booters, will
respond by adapting to the pressure. In this case, we
do not have enough quantitative measurements to ac-
cess the effectiveness or the full range of responses to
our attempt to undermine their payment infrastructure.
However, we have identified several common classes of
adaptations in response to the intervention.
Alternate payment methods. Most booters have
added Bitcoin as an alternate payment methods and
have posted links to services that allow customers to
purchase bitcoins using credit cards or PayPal. In ad-
dition to bitcoins some switched to Google Wallet and
others added the option to pay using virtual curren-
cies, such as Webmoney and Perfect Money. By all ac-
counts these have resulted in reduced customer bases if
the booter cannot directly accept credit card payments.
Evidenced by the fact that many booters continued to
replace their PayPal accounts even when previous ones
were limited and their funds were lost. Assuming that
alternative payment methods did not result in reduced
revenue or higher costs there would be little incentive to
continue using risky payment methods, such as PayPal.
Referrer anonymizing services. We have noticed
that some booters have stopped directly linking to Pay-
Pal and are now linking to an intermediary site and then
redirecting the customer’s browser from this intermedi-
ary domain to PayPal’s site. This intermediary redirec-
tion site is used to hide the booter’s real domain name in
the referrer field from PayPal. A subset of booters have
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also started to replace this intermediary domain every
time they replace a PayPal account. The effect of this
is that it requires active crawling and measurements of
booter sites to identify a booter’s new PayPal account
bypasses passive methods PayPal could use to linking
accounts, such as by using referrers. This has increased
the difficulty of monitoring booter’s PayPal accounts
and effort required to investigate these accounts.
Offline payment. Finally, in some cases booters have
posted that customers must open a ticket to pay using
PayPal. This method increases the effort to monitor
the booter for new accounts, since instead of an au-
tomated crawler someone must now interact with the
booter service manually. It also increases the difficulty
of PayPal’s investigation into the nature of the mer-
chant account. However, this method also requires the
booter service to manually activate each account and
drives away customers that are seeking automated sub-
scription purchasing systems.
7. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have gathered a few key points from ours and
the community’s efforts to understand and undermine
these DDoS services. Most of these potential strategies
involve driving up costs of operating booter services and
reducing the convenience of subscribing. This might
force these booters from operating largely unopposed in
the open to more resilient hosting, attack and payment
infrastructure for which they pay a premium due to the
risk of support services being taken down or blacklisted
for being associated with DDoS attackers.
Reducing scale. Limiting access to convenient pay-
ment methods, such as PayPal, had an impact on the
scale of booter services based on our quantitative and
qualitative analysis. However, criminal-to-criminal pay-
ment infrastructure is more resilient then consumer-to-
criminal payment infrastructure. As future work, we
plan to understand how to improve the effectiveness of
these interventions and make them sustainable. This in
part requires developing more robust monitoring tools
that better mitigate countermeasures being deployed to
make their payment methods more robust to interven-
tions. To this end, we are working on building a generic
crawler that can learn how to navigate a booter site and
map out payment accounts. This would reduce the bur-
den of having to create and maintain custom crawlers
for each site.
Reducing effectiveness of attacks. We plan to con-
tinue our monitoring efforts of the amplification servers
used by booters and begin sharing this information with
existing patching efforts, such as the OpenResolverPro-
ject [2] and OpenNTPProject [1]. Along with this, we
plan to experiment with active notifications sent to the
ISP and abuse contact for the server. Our hope is that
by focusing mitigation efforts on actively abused am-
plifiers, we can mitigate the pool of more stable am-
plifiers and thus reduce the effectiveness of booter at-
tacks as they are forced to use less stable amplifiers and
protocols with a lower bandwidth amplification factor.
There is some indications that active notification im-
proves patching rates in another context [8].
Increasing costs. This might be achieved with an in-
creased effort to locate and blacklist or de-peer low-cost
hosting services that cater to DDoS attacks by provid-
ing the ability to spoof and unlimited bandwidth. This
might force these services to pay a premium for bullet-
proof hosting attack servers, which would result in re-
duced profitability or be passed along to subscribers in
the form of increased subscription costs. In addition,
convincing CloudFlare and other free anti-DDoS ser-
vices to prohibit these booter services would increase
their costs by forcing them to build and pay for anti-
DDoS services that cater to these abusive booters. Ad-
mittedly these suggestions will likely not result in large
cost increases unless tremendous amounts of pressure
were placed on these parts of their infrastructure.
8. CONCLUSION
Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that will mit-
igate the threat posed by booter services overnight.
These booters have grown in scale due to the perceived
low-risk nature, their profitability and increasing de-
mand for DDoS attacks as a method of knocking out
the competition, harassment and censorship on the In-
ternet.
In this paper we have mapped out a range of support
infrastructure that booters depend on in terms of ad-
vertising, attack, hosting and payment. We have also
measured the effectiveness of ongoing attack infrastruc-
ture interventions and demonstrated the potential effec-
tiveness of a payment intervention. Our measurement
techniques, including direct observations by interacting
with these booters and support services, such as hosting
providers, highlight potential improvements to ongo-
ing efforts to undermine attack infrastructure by focus
patching efforts on abused NTP and Chargen servers
and exposing ISPs and hosting centers that enable these
attacks. We also demonstrated that payment interven-
tions, which undermine the accessibility of convenient
payment methods, such as PayPal, can potentially have
an impact on reducing the scale of these services. Our
hope is that by continuing to explore new methods for
understanding and undermining booters, we can iden-
tify increasingly effective methods of adding friction,
cost and risk to these ventures that further erodes their
attack potency, scale and profitability over time.
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